An Ecofeminist Approach to Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation: Assessing Slow Violence in Environmental Damages
I. Introduction
Private international law, historically established to resolve cross-border disputes through choice-of-law rules governing jurisdiction and applicable law, currently faces challenges in the era of climate change. Mostly, if not every, environmental damage is a matter of “slow violence” that unfolds diffusely and spreads across borders. Rox Nixon characterised slow violence as an event of gradual, delayed environmental destruction that is “scientifically convoluted,” operating as a threat multiplier resulting in conflicts. This very aspect disrupts legal regulations based on linear causation, discrete events, and damages believed to be bounded by territory.
The existing framework struggles with the concept of slow violence because, at the time of adoption, the drafters wouldn’t have anticipated the complexity of climate change and its effects. Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation is rooted in the “principle of ubiquity,” which is intended to privilege the interests of victims. Yet its application in complex transnational climate litigation raises interpretational issues, including the “event” in cases of slow-onset environmental damage.
This divide anticipates a critical interpretation within Article 7 of the Rome II regulation regarding the constituents of a single, identifiable event causing damage. This article adopts an ecofeminist approach to address the challenges of slow violence, emphasising relationality and cyclical processes, enabling the reconceptualisation of the regulation of environmental damage. So, while critiquing the hierarchical structures rooted in capitalism and patriarchy, this approach questions the claimed neutral stance of conflict of laws and presents the ecological and social perspective in the legal argument.
II. Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation - The “Event Giving Rise to the Damage”
According to Article 7, claimants or victims of environmental damage can choose which law applies, either the law of the place where the damage occurred (lex loci damni) or the law of the place where the event that caused the harm took place. This establishes a shift from the usual lex loci damni as a general rule under Article 4(1) of the regulation to an alternative approach to determine the applicable law. The framework is progressive in providing access to advantageous legal regimes for victims based on the principle of ubiquity, to choose either the place of damage or the place of conduct leading to the damage.
Conceptually, its framework reflects the traditional tort rules which view damages or wrongs as discrete and temporally bounded actions. This is rather well-suited for instances of damages characterised by a single event, as it is difficult to pinpoint a single event in cross-border climate damages, such as greenhouse emissions. In this context, the European Commission indeed maintains that these traditional rules are “problematic” for contemporary conflicts that are complex and span across several countries.
III. Ecofeminism and the Temporal Understanding of “Event”
The limitation in current understanding of causation in climate litigation invites alternative approaches to the concept of an “event”. One such is the ecofeminist approach, which relates the experiences of women and marginalised groups to the dominion of nature, arguing that both are rooted in patriarchy and capitalist hierarchical structures. Certain ecofeminist scholars, such as Val Plumwood, Carolyn Merchant, Vandana Shiva, and Greta Gaard, have emphasised the critique of the “hierarchical dualism” of nature/culture, reason/emotion, man/woman.
A temporal understanding shifts attention from a single event of harm to the longer processes through which the damage accumulates over time. For instance, Plumwood critiques anthropocentrism and argues that it caters to human use while reducing values embedded in nonhuman nature. This reveals how the legal system has privileged linear anthropocentric understandings of harm that marginalise ecological processes. Thus, ecofeminism challenges this global perspective that puts humans first and treats nature as something to be controlled. This is particularly relevant to cumulative environmental damage, when the entity causing damage is part of the relational process and certainly not an isolated act.
Such an approach is well-reasoned in Milieudefensie & Others v. Royal Dutch Shell plc, where the Hague district court applied Article 7 to the company’s CO2 emissions that occurred elsewhere. However, victims argued for invoking the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred, and the court upheld this. Here, the event is the policy or corporate decision taken at the company’s headquarters in the Netherlands that resulted in the subsequent emissions. This corporate decision was considered to be one of the events that caused damage to Dutch residents. The court’s verdict reflects the line of argument and asserts that environmental damages from climate change have a direct effect on the ecology that extends beyond territorial boundaries. The relational feminist approach to private international law takes a similar view that, instead of focusing only on individuals or nations, it considers other intricate and interdependent stakeholders surrounding the harm.
IV. Reconceptualising Article 7
Applying the ecofeminist approach challenges the current legal system, in which laws are temporally bounded. This approach views nature and marginalised populations as territorially interconnected stakeholders in the conflict and not mere compartmentalised victims. Therefore, Article 7 concerning applicable law in a tort of environmental damage needs to be interpreted broadly. This shift in application and interpretation by courts will benefit the victims in realising their rights in cases of environmental damage
Since Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation determines the applicable law, the judge’s interpretation shapes the outcome of climate litigation. This is known as the “judicial temperament”, referring to the “empathy” of the courts to acknowledge harm that develops gradually. Historically, legal systems weren’t equipped to address such concerns, leaving vulnerable victims as mere statistical data. This results in effectively suppressing the existing structural inequalities of gender, indigenous communities, and age-related impacts, far from the main concern. The attempt to reconceptualise Article 7 requires efforts to overcome this hierarchical notion and evolve in judge’s interpreting that, often, if not every time, damages unfold slowly in a non-linear model.
While asserting the reconceptualisation, it also becomes pertinent to understand what it means for the future of climate litigation. This approach curtails state’s and corporation’s attempts to evade liability by positioning the concerned projects or industries as a matter of “national strategic interest”. This effectively challenges the exceptional circumstances created by them and prioritises the lived experiences of the victims and the environment. So, when connecting intersectional vulnerability to the damage, it asserts climate change litigation as a pressing issue in the present, and not merely an issue of the future.
V. Conclusion
In contemporary times, with the development of transnational climate change litigation, there is a need for a broader perspective to address the growing concerns. The ecofeminist and temporal approaches to Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation reconceptualise the interpretation of the event that caused the damage. Shifting from a single isolated moment, environmental damage is interpreted as a continuous, slow violence, and protects the victims while holding such corporations accountable for their actions.
On one hand, this expansion of the event to diffuse climate processes might compromise legal certainty and increase the risk of forum shopping. In contrast, from an ecofeminist approach, the existing structure comes off as a biased legal hierarchy, and legal certainty cannot be weaponised to promote corporate actors operating at the transnational level. In contemporary times of anthropocentrism, interpreting Article 7 with a relational approach ensures that the liability of corporate actors and the rights of the concerned population are strictly balanced.
All that is required is that the regulation be interpreted purposively, that is, grounded in the favor laesi (favoring the injured) and in line with the acknowledgement of slow violence. This way, courts can transition to the contemporary realities of climate change and the eventual tort of environmental damages.





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